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Abstract :  The management of earnings or Earnings Management defined as management activities 
for adjusting earnings according to specific objectives. Therefore, empirical evidence 
showing the impact of Institutional and managerial Ownership, intellectual capital, audit 
quality on income management is necessary. 14 transportation companies listed on the 
Indonesian stock exchange were surveyed in accordance with the research criteria. A 
purposeful sampling method collected data. The SPSS 23 application tests the multiple 
linear regression hypothesis. Of the variables used in this study, only intellectual capital 
has a positive impact on profit management and can be used as one of the indicators in 
future research to measure income management actions. 
 
Keywords :  Earning Management, Institutional and managerial Ownership, Intellectua Capital, 
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1.  Introduction 
In 2019, there was an issue on manipulation of financial report  at PT Garuda Indonesia Tbk. 
Dony O. and Chairal T., as commissioners of Garuda, made refusal in signing the Company's 
financial statement. They objected to claim revenues of USD 239.94 million. (Prastowo, 2019). 
Similar cases occurred at PT Bank Lippo Tbk. The management of PT Bank Lippo Tbk. reported 
assets of Rp22.8 trillion, a net loss of RP1.2 trillion and a CAR (capital adequacy ratio) of 4.2% 
(Khairani & Wimelda, 2017). 
These cases relate to the Financial Report. In such cases, the financial report is interpreted 
as a management output. In this output, the balance sheet and company performance in a 
particular period are included. It's for those who need economic decision-making 
(Widyaningrum, 2018). For full disclosure and transparency, the financial report should be 
presented to avoid misleading readers of a financial report (Antonia, 2008). The quality, 
application and actuality of the financial statements require a qualified auditor. In the auditing of 
financial reports and when there are mistakes or fraud, auditors who are integral always take care 
(Wiryadi & Sebrina, 2013). 
Adjusting the financial report for particular purposes is not uncommon for management. 
Management is most frequently used to manipulate the company's income this year or to stock 
earnings in the next year. The management of the earnings may lead to problems with the 
organization, since the shareholders and managers play a role. Management as an officer has more 
than the principal information. This information asymmetry makes it possible for the 
agent/management to manage earnings (Alfarano, 2005) (Lambert, 2012). 
A good company must have corporate governance that can minimize the management of its 
income by separating owners and managers by distinguishing between management and 
managerial types of shareholding structures (Alfarano, 2005) (Lambert, 2012). Management is 
meant to reduce income management practices as much as possible. Other parties to the contract 
shall consider shareholders who are also managers of the company. The Board of Directors 
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should therefore be motivated to produce adequate financial statements. Furthermore, institutional 
ownership is expected to provide a similar monitoring mechanism (Yulistiani, 2020). 
Intellectual capital is categorized into three categories, namely customers, structural capital 
and human capital (Yudhanti & Shanti, 2011). Boekestein (2006) describes human capital as 
employee's knowledge, while structural capital is the entity's knowledge and customer capital is 
the client's own (Ulum, 2009). As the foundation of company growth is considered intellectual 
capital, the strategic role of intellectual capital grows and becomes even the main / major part to 
increase company value (Chen, 2004). 
 
2. Literarure Review 
Stakeholder 
Stakeholders are a group/individual which influences/is influenced in achieving organizational 
objectives, quoted by Freeman and Reed (1983, page 91) as referred to by Kalbuana (2020). On 
this basis, management carries out activities and reports to stakeholders. Stakeholders can receive 
management information about their work, whether or not that information can be used, and 
stakeholders directly participate in or do not participate in the role of organisation. The theory of 
stakeholders aims to increase the value of organizational activities and reduce the loss of 
stakeholders as a result of a relationship between companies and stakeholders. 
 
Agency Theory 
This theory is based on managers' relationship as agents and investors as contract managers. As a 
consequence of the agreement between investor and agent, the manager can carry out activities 
that the investor does not prefer that allow for cost of agencies (Widyaningrum, 2018). These 
costs include monitoring costs (investor expenses so that managers are still in control of their 
behaviour), bonding (manager guaranteed costs will not harm investors) and residual losses These 
cost agencies include monitoring costs (decreasing percentage in welfare level after an agency 
relationship exist). 
The conflict between this agency and the manager can lead to information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetry can be defined as a condition in which the information gathered between 
managers and investors differs and causes information imbalance. Managers and investors need 
intermediaries to control and monitor the performance of managers (agents) to match the needs of 





From this framework, the following hypotheses are formulated: 
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H1 : Intellectual capital, institutional and managerial ownership and audit quality simultaneously 
have an effecf toward earning management 
H2 : Intellectual capital has an effecf toward earning management 
H3 : Institutional ownership has an effecf toward earning management 
H4 : Managerial ownership has an effecf toward earning management 
H5 :  Audit quality has an effecf toward earning management 
 
3.  Methodology 
This study utilize financial statement of transport companies listed on IDX accessed at 
www.idx.co.id as secondary data.  
3.1  Measurement of Variables and Defining Operations 
3.1.1  Intellectual Capital 
According to Sawarjuwono & Kadir (2003), intellectual capital is defined as a combination of 
structural capital, customer capital, and human capital. This combination which has relationship 
to science and technology has a purpose to increase companies’ value-added competitiveness in 
global. The intellectual capital variable is assessed using Pulic's VAIC ™ coefficient developed 
by Ulum (2009) by calculating the following equation: 
a.  VA (Value Added) 
  
Definition:   
VA: Value Added 
OUT: Output (total of sales and other revenue) 
IN: Input (sales expenses and other costs other   than employeement expenses) 
 
b.  VACA (Value Added Capital Employed) 
                                  
Definition: 
VACA: Value Added Capital Employed 
VA: Value Added 
CE: Capital Employed (available funds; equity) 
 
c.  VAHU (Value Added Human Capital) 
    
Definition: 
VAHU: Value Added Human Capital 
VA: Value Added 
HC: Human Capital (employeement expense) 
 
d.   STVA (Structural Capital Value Added) 
 
Definition: 
STVA: Structural Capital Value Added 
SC: Structural Capital (VA – HC)  
VA: Value Added 
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ToAit/Atit-1 = β1(1/Atit-1) + β2(ΔRevtit/Atit-1) + β3(PPEit/Atit-1) + ε 
e.   VAIC™ (Value Added Intellectual Coefficient of the three coefficients above) 
 
 
3.1.2  Institutional Ownership (INST) 
It is defined as ownership by an outside party to share ownership of a company. These shares can 
be owned by parties who can not easily rely on companies, such as the government, pension fund 
companies, banks, insurance and so on (Khairani & Wimelda, 2017). INST compares the 
institutional ownership of shares with the total share capital of the company (Welvin, I. G., & 




3.1.3  Managerial Ownership 
Managerial Ownership is defined as shares of ownership by the company management or by a 
subsidiary. Managerial ownership is calculated by comparing the shareholding by management 




3.1.4 Audit Quality 
Quality of audit is measured by the four biggest public accounting firm as a dummy variable and 
is given a score of 1 on the financial statements audited by one of the biggest four of public 
accounting firms.  The financial statements is given score 0 when audited by a public accounting 
firm other than the big four  (Wiryadi & Sebrina, 2013). 
 
3.1.5  Earning Management  
It is defined as management actions to adjust earning for specific objectives, either by reducing or 
increasing earning in financial reporting (Scott, 2011) . Modified Jones Model approach is used to 
determine earnings management and identified by the score of discretionary accruals (Dechow et 
al, 1995). Discretionary accruals are gained by finding the following values: 





ToAit   : Total Accrual company i year t 
NIncit.  : Net Income (net earning before tax year t) 
CFOit.  : Cash Flow Operation (operating cash flow t) 
 





ToAit: Total Accrual year tPPEit : Fixed assets year t 
Atit-1: Total assets of company i in period t-1 β1, 2, 3 : Coefisien 
ToAit = NIncit - CFOit 
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NDAtit = β1(1/Atit-1) + β2((ΔRevtit - ΔRectit /Atit-1) + β3(PPEit/Ait-1) + ε 
DAtit = (TAtit/Atit-1) - NDAtit 
Y = α + βX1 + βX2 + βX3 + βX4 + ε 
ΔRevtit: Year income t minus year income t-1ε : Error 
 




NDAtit : Nondiscretionary Accruals company i year t 
PPEit: Fixed assets year t 
Atit-1: Total assets of company i in period t-1 
β1, 2, 3 : Coefisien 
ΔRevtit : Year income t minus year income t-1 
ε : Error 
ΔRectit : Trade accounts receivable for year t less trade receivables for year t-1 
 




DAtit: Discretionary Accruals company i year t 
TAtit: Total Accrual company i year t 
Atit-1: Total assets of company i in period t-1 
NDAtit : Nondiscretionary Accruals company i year t 
 
3.2  Method of Data Analysis 
Multiple linear regression analysis was used to test Hypothesis in this examination. 
Autocorrelation test, a multicollinearity test, a heteroscedasticity test, and a normality test were 
completed to ensure the data is tested normally distributed and unbound from classical 
assumptions. Furthermore, the hypothesis test includes the coefficient of determination, F test 
(simultaneous), and t test (partial test). The following equation describes the multiple linear 




Y  : Earning ManagementX2: Institutional Ownership 
α   : ConstantaX3: Managerial ownership 
β   : Regression CoefficientX4: Audit Quality 
X1 : Intellectual Capital ε: Error 
 
4. Analysis and Results  
4.1 Statistical Description Analysis Results 
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 Source: processed secondary data 
 
On the basis of the information, from 2014 to 2018, 14 transport companies published 70 
financial statements. The mean variable for earning management is 0.069571 and std. 0.2907837 
deviation. The score minimum is 0.0000, and the maximum score is 0.0000. 2.22827. 
An average of 2 970083 and Std is the independent intellectual variable capital. 4.5711032 
deviation. Coud is interpreted as having a VAICTM score of 2.00 to 2 in the company categorized 
as good performers. Intellectual capital has a small score in its independent variable. The max 
score of 0.0000 is 27.32. The deviation score can be due to the company's diversity of treatment in 
the use of intellectual capital to increase the company's value. 
The mean variable of institutional ownership was 0.436889 and std. 0.2994370 deviation. In 
other words 43.69% of the institution's average share. Min score is 0.0000 and max value of this 
variable. 0.9772. 
The mean score is 0.284140 and Std for management ownership variable. 0.2978119 
deviation. This means that the sample is owned by parties associated with the company and its 
subsidiaries, which represents 28.41 percent of its average share. Min score of 0.0000 and max 
score 0.8646 of this variable. 
The variable quality of audit is medium to 0.171 and std. 0.3796 deviation. deviation. This 
variable's maximum score is 1 and the minimum score is 0. This value is the result of a stupid 
audit variable by the four largest and four non-largest public accountants. 
 
4.2 Result of Hypothesis Testing 
4.2.1  Coefficient of Determination (Adjusted R2) 
Table 1.2 Determination Coefficient Test Results 
              
Source: processed secondary data 
 
Table 1.2 illustrate that coefficient of determination (Adjusted R2) score is 0.377. The 
variable intellectual capital, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and audit quality have 
an effect of 37.7% on earning management. Other variables that affect earning management that 
were not covered in this study is 62.3%. 
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4.4.2  Statistical Test F (Simultaneous Test)  
Table 1.3 F Statistik test Result 
 
Source: processed secondary data 
 
According to table 1.3, the score obtained from the F test were 11.444. This means that the 
F test score obtained is bigger than the F table score of 2.513. In conclusion, the variables of 
intellectual capital, audit quality, and institutional ownership as well as managerial ownership 
simultaneously have effect toward earning management. Therefore, H1 is accepted. 
 
4.4.3  Statistical Test t (Partial Test) 
Table 1.4 “t” Statistik Test Result 
 
 Source: processed secondary data 
 
According to Table 1.4, the intellectual capital variable obtained t score 6.413 and 
coefficient score 0.041. ‘t’ arithmetic is higher than score of t table (1.66827). It indicates that the 
effect of intellectual capital variable toward earning management is positive. Therefore, H2 is 
accepted. 
The second variable, institutional ownership, has a t score of -0.332 and a coefficient -
0.064. The t score is less than t table obtained (1.66792). It shows that the effect of institutional 
ownership variable toward earning management is negative. Therefore, H3 is declined. The 
results of this research correspond to the research directed by Welvin, I. G., & Herawati (2010), 
Widyaningrum (2018). The huge share ownership supposes making institutional has control over 
operational activities. In fact institutional ownership could not limit earning management 
practices (Widyaningrum, 2018). 
The third variable, managerial ownership, has a t score -0.798 and a coefficient -0.160. The 
t score is less than the t table score obtained. It shows that managerial ownership has no effect on 
earning management. Hence, H4 is rejected. The results of this study are corresponding to the 
research conducted by Welvin, I. G., & Herawati (2010), Abed et al. (2012), and Widyaningrum, 
(2018). However, this research disputes the results of research conducted by Nabila (2013), 
Mahariana & Ramantha (2014), and Sari & Putri (2014) which conclude that negative effect 
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occurred from managerial ownership toward earning management. Corresponding to Sari & Putri 
(2014), earning management can be reduced since there is managerial ownership through 
managers who can protect their shares dropping due to these actions. 
Audit quality, as the last variable, has t score -1.079 and coefficient score -0.084. The t table 
score was still higher than t score. It indicates that there is no effect from audit quality toward 
earning management. Thus, H5 is rejected. This result is corresponding to the research conducted 
by Welvin, I. G., & Herawati (2010) and Wiryadi & Sebrina (2013). Companies audited by big 
KAP do not necceceraly mean they can restrain the occurrence of earning management (Wiryadi 
& Sebrina, 2013). 
 
5. Result And Conclusions  
The study concludes with the effect of management of transportation companies in terms of 
intellectual capital or corporate governance simultaneously supported by institutional ownership, 
management and audit quality. The effect on earnings management was confirmed by the 
intellectual capital variable. Nevertheless, the effect of institutional ownership and management 
ownership on earnings management and audit quality has been denied. H1 and H2 are therefore 
accepted only. The result confirms the impact on earnings management of variable intellectual 
capital. It shows empirically that intellectual capital can be an indicator of income management. 
According to the results, both institutional and managerial ownership measured/proxied 
management variable have no impact on income management. Corporate governance cannot limit 
earning management practices by using institutional ownership structure expected to have control 
over operating activities of the company. Accordingly, shareholding in the managing company 
does not preclude an adjustment of management of earnings. 
The audit quality variable has no impact on earnings management, according to the results 
of this study. While the financial report has been audited by the big four KAP, the company's 
profit management behavior cannot be limited. 
This research has several boundaries which further research could improve. The research 
constraints and recommendations for future research are: 14 transportation companies from a total 
of 70 companies in idx.co.id are investigated in this research. In the forthcoming research, similar 
business sectors like infrastructure and utilities should be used or supplemented. In this study, two 
variables based on the share ownership structure were taken up by corporate governance. In order 
to measure/support corporate governance, any forthcoming research is proposed to use the 
variables of the audit agency, Independent Commissioner and the board of directors. Rarely do 
research study the correlation between the impact on income management of intellectual capital. 
Most studies use intellectual capital variables for measuring enterprise performance as indicators. 
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